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NOTES
GLENN AVANN MCCLEARY, who contributes Liability of an
Employer for the Negligence of an Independent Contractor
in Missouri, received his J.D. degree from the University of
Michigan in 1924. He is Professor of Law at the University
of Missouri.
THE SCHOOL OF LAW
In connection with the commencement exercises, it was an-
nounced that George Winslow Simpkins, Stanley M. Richman, and
Alfred W. Petschaft had been graduated with final honors in the
School of Law. The Alumni Prize for maintaining the highest
scholastic average during the entire three year course of study
was awarded to George Winslow Simpkins. Mr. Simpkins also
was the recipient of the Richard Wagner Brown Prize, awarded
annually to the member of the graduating class who, in the estima-
tion of the faculty, best exemplifies the qualities of scholarship,
leadership and character. The Mary Hitchcock Thesis Prize was
won by Louis Shanfeld, with honorable mention to David Priwer.
Notes
AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTION TO PREVENT THE
ASSESSMENT OR COLLECTION OF A FEDERAL TAX
Historically courts of equity reluctantly granted injunctions as
preventive relief against the levy, assessment or collection of a
tax. Their reluctance was based on a conviction that courts
should not embarrass or delay officers in the collection of the reve-
nue necessary for the existence of government. Judges thought
it more desirable that the collection of taxes be speedy, than thatjustice be speedily given to individuals.' The temporary incon-
venience the individual suffered in paying a controverted tax and
litigating his rights in a subsequent suit for recovery was held a
far less grave consequence than the possible chaos which would
ensue should the hands of tax officials be tied by indiscriminate
use of preventive equitable processes. But this reluctance did
not in any sense amount to a prohibition on the jurisdiction of
courts of equity. It has not meant that an injunction could not
ICooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) vol. 4, Sec. 1640 et seq.; 4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (3rd ed.) sec. 1779; High, Injunctions (4th ed. 1905)
vol. 1, Sec. 485; note, 10 Col. Law Rev. 564; State Railroad Tax Cases (1875)
92 U. S. 575.
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be had in any case of wrongful collection of a tax. The courts
have consistently been jealous of their jurisdiction. They have
not given up equitable jurisdiction in tax matters. Where a well
recognized ground of equitable jurisdiction was present, the tax-
payer could have his restraining writ against the collector or
other tax official.2
Legislative bodies and administrative officers have been im-
mensely more concerned about impediments to rapid collection of
taxes than have courts. Their attitude follows from the direct
responsibility of the legislature and administrative officials for
the raising of revenue. They are more concerned with raising
money than with individual justice. The apparent harmony be-
tween the courts and tax officers in believing that the collection of
taxes must necessarily be summary and speedy is not real. On
the one hand the courts, while acceding to the general proposi-
tion of noninterference, have been willing to interfere and halt
proceedings for assessment or collection of a tax where a proper
equitable basis is shown. On the other hand, tax officers and
legislative bodies have tended to apply the principle that courts
should in no case intervene before payment of the tax and that
the taxpayer should be confined to a suit to recover the tax after
payment.3
It seems certain Congress intended to limit existing jurisdic-
tion of the Federal courts and to insure observance of the second
principle above when in 1867, by amendment to Revenue Act of
1866, section 3224 of the Revised Statutes was enacted. The
section reads, "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.4"1
The broad language of the statute, chiefly the use of the word
"any", seems to make it inclusive in its terms and to prohibit
Federal courts from taking jurisdiction in any suit which has
for its purpose the restraining of assessment or collection of a
tax. It would have been difficult for Congress to indicate this
meaning more explicitly. But, the history of the treatment of
section 3224 by the courts shows they have not regarded it as abso-
lute in its prohibitions.
The first court to construe the act, a lower Federal court, held
it constitutional and applied it to deny an injunction in Pullan v.
2Dow v. Chicago (1872) 11 Wall. 108. Cooley, Taxation, note 1 above.
3 Cooley, Taxation, above, note 1, sees. 1200-1.
4 14 Stat. 474 (1867), (1928) 26 U. S. C. 154.
Two recent enactments affect the above section. 26 U. S. C. 1048 (1924)
places a restriction on it by allowing an injunction in the very limited set of
facts indicated. 26 U. S. C. 2604 (1928) extends the prohibition of the
statute to injunctions by transferees of property. In this connection see
Trinance Real Estate Co. v. Clark (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 325.
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Kissinger.5 The court reviewed the common law and pointed
out that "according to English equity an injunction would not go
in any case analogous to the case at bar." The principle that an
injunction would not lie to restrain a merely illegal tax was reiter-
ated. In connection with constitutionality of the statute it was
said, "The statute was wholly unnecessary, enacted only as a
politic and kindly publication of an old and familiar rule."
The statute was first applied in the Supreme Court in the case
of Snyder v. Marks( in 1883. In the intervening time there had
been other lower court decisions which followed the result reached
in Pullan v. Kissinger. The Supreme Court approved the cur-
rent of decisions without an examination of the reasoning of the
Pullan case. The Supreme Court indicated it regarded the in-
hibitions of the statute as extending to all suits directed at any
tax assessed or collected by officers under color of their office.
Since that time the current of decisions has followed Snyder v.
Marks but has recognized certain so-called exceptions whichjustify the granting of injunctions. The culmination of the cases
establishing the so-called exceptions is the recent case of Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co.7, which, if followed, will make sec-
tion 3224 meaningless as far as changing the historic jurisdiction
of equity courts.
The Standard Nut Margarine Company engaged in the manu-
facture of a vegetable oil product, sold for cooking purposes. In
a previous decision a similar product was held not a butter imi-
tation and not subject to a ten cent tax on oleomargarine.8 The
Commissioner of internal revenue made an administrative find-
ing, disregarding the above decision, and held defendant's prod-
uct was sold as oleomargarine and subject to the tax. An injunc-
tion against collection of the tax was granted in the instant case.
The equity recognized by the court as justifying the injunction
was irreparable injury, since complainant had a widespread
business which would be ruined by the forced payment of the tax
and the consequent higher price necessary on its product. Mr.
Justice Butler speaking for the court held; (1), independently of
and prior to enactment of section 3224 the Supreme Court fol-
lowed the recognized equity rule that a suit would not lie to re-
strain a tax solely on the ground of illegality; (2), the court also
recognized the rule that where complainant shows that in addi-
5 (C. C. Ohio 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 11, 463. The act does not apply to in-junction by Federal courts against a state tax. State Railroad Tax Cases,
above note 2. Obviously no state court could prevent Federal officers col-
lecting a Federal tax. Keely v. Saunders (1879) 99 U. S. 441.
6 (1883) 109 U. S. 189.
7 (1932) 284 U. S. 498. See comment, 32 Col. Law Review 743.
Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page (D. C. R. I. 1924) 297 F. 644.
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tion to the illegality there exist special and extraordinary circum-
stances sufficient to bring the case within some acknowledged
head of equity jurisprudence an injunction will be granted; (3),
section 3224 is declaratory of the first mentioned principle and is
to be construed as nearly as possible in harmony with it; (4), the
rule as stated in the statute does not refer to cases involving ex-
ceptional circumstances. The general words employed in the
statute are not sufficient and it would require more specific words
to warrant the inference that Congress intended to abrogate the
salutory and well established rule as to injunctions in equitable
cases. Mr. Justice Stone joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dis-
sented, stating in a short opinion, "Enacted in 1867 this statute
for more than sixty years has been consistently applied as pre-
cluding relief, whatever the equities alleged."
Justice Stone's brief comment adopts the view that the statute
is absolute in its prohibitions and that an injunction suit should
not be entertained in any case where a tax is involved (this would
not exclude an injunction where a penalty, wrongly called a tax
is involved). Whatever may be the reasons of policy or justice
which can be advanced against the rule, it is probable that it ex-
presses what Congress intended in enacting section 3224. A con-
siderable number of cases had followed this view.
A second view, the one adopted by the majority of the court
above is that section 3224 was a declaration of the then existing
law; and when an injunction is sought, the established and ac-
cepted equitable rule will be applied. This interpretation was ad-
vanced by a small minority of courts long before the decision in
the Miller case.9
The third view, and the one most widely accepted, is that an in-
junction will not be granted to restrain assessment or collection
of a federal tax, unless the imposition is one that comes within
several recognized exceptions laid down in earlier decisions.10
The decided cases will be examined to determine the relation
of previous decisions and interpretations to the Supreme Court's
conception of 3224 expressed in Miller v. Standard Nut Marga-
rine Co. The situations in which injunctions have been granted
in spite of the statute, and which comprise the so-called excep-
tions, indicate a trend towards the above conception. It can here
9 See, Enjoining the United States. John C. Gall (1923) 10 Va. L. Re-
view 194.
10 See, Restraining the Collection of Federal Taxes. Clarence A. Miller
(1923) 71 U. of Penn. Law Review 318. "It may, therefore be said that
section 3224 R. S. prohibits the granting of an injunction restraining the
collection of federal taxes unless its provisions are rendered inapplicable
to a particular case because of extraordinary and exceptional circumstances."
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be noted that the reported cases in which an injunction was de-
nied are in a ratio of about six to one to those in which an in-
junction was granted, thus indicating a conservative tendency
in the courts in spite of the exceptions recognized. 11
The situation which has permitted of the largest number of
injunctions is the so-called exceptions which arose in connection
with the levy of a "tax" which was really a penalty. The at-
tempted levy of a penalty as a tax and the collection of it by tax
officers may be enjoined and it is uniformly held section 3224 has
no application. The principle asserted is that the statute refers
to taxes and is not to be extended by analogy to penalties. This
rule is in accord with well recognized principle of statutory in-
terpretation. It is easy to perceive that simply calling an im-
position a tax does not make it a tax. A wide discretion has been
accorded Congress in levying taxes, but where it has imposed
levy or fine which fits the description of a penalty rather than a
tax the courts have declared the levy void. In a true sense this is
not an exception to the operation of the statute. However, in
most cases the court accepts jurisdiction and then decides the levy
is a penalty in the guise of a tax. If section 3224 were strictly ap-
plied it could not accept jurisdiction until after the levy had been
established as not a true tax.
A majority of the cases asserting this principle arose in con-
nection with provisions of the National Prohibition Act. At-
tempts were made to collect taxes provided in the act, which had
all the attributes of criminal penalties, and also attempts were
made to collect similar taxes existing previous to the passage of
the Volstead Act. The taxpayers sought quick relief in equity
courts.
In Lipke v. Lederer,12 the collector of internal revenue attempt-
ed to levy a tax on an illegal sale of liquor, without a notice or
hearing to complainant. The injunction was granted, the court
asserting that, "the mere use of the word tax in an act primarily
designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that
within the intendment of the term a tax was laid", and further,
"the collector demanded payment of a penalty and section 3224,
which prohibits suits to restrain assessment or collection of any
tax is without application." 1-3
11 Out of sixty typical cases in the Federal courts in the last fifteen years
injunctions were granted in only ten cases. Out of these ten five were
granted because the so-called tax was held to be a penalty in the guise of
a tax.
12 (1921) 259 U. S. 557.
Is See, Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell (1922) 260 U. S. 234; Ledbetter v.
Bailey (D. C. N. C. 1921) 274 F. 375, "This is a statute having in view the
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In an early case, Frayser v. Russell,14 the collector of revenue
imposed an additional tax or penalty after the regular tax had
been paid on a quantity of tobacco, the collector being wholly
without authority. An injunction was granted because the court
had previously held it was an illegal levy and not a tax. There-
fore section 3224 could not apply. The court also indicated there
was a separate and distinct basis for an injunction in that it
would prevent a multiplicity of suits because a large number of
similar suits were pending. The view adopted indicates the court
thought of section 3224 in terms of principles regularly enforced
by the Federal courts in equity cases.
A few cases have applied section 3224 to a case involving pen-
alties, but they can be distinguished on the peculiar facts involved.
Most of them were decided before the decision of Lipke v.
Lederer.'5
The distinguishing of a penalty from a tax is in accord with the
policy of the Supreme Court in other situations involving pseudo-
taxes, such as in the second Child Labor Case, where the distinc-
tion was made for the purpose of determining constitutionality.10
It may appear that an illegal or unconstitutional tax is not
properly or in the strict sense a tax and in view of the principle
laid down above an injunction could properly be granted. But
such is not the rule. Section 3224 is not restricted in its mean-
orderly and uninterrupted collection of the revenues of government, which
are necessary to meet the current expenses and public obligations. But in
order to make this statute applicable a tax which is to be collected must be
lawful; it must be founded upon some proper subject of taxation; must be
assessed in a proper way and collected in a legal manner." The judge's
definition of an illegal tax is too broad. In Thame v. Lynch (D. C. Minn.
1921) 269 F. 995 where injunctions were granted in thirty-three cases
arising under taxes levied on illicit liquor it is said "The reasoning under-
lying Sec. 3224 R. S. is that the government shall not be delayed or interfered
with in collection of its revenues. They relate to properly called taxes; that
is, exactions for revenue uses of government." In Coffer v. Noel (D. C. Va.
1926) 11 F. (2d) 399, the injunction was granted because, under pietense
of taxation the government was attempting to punish for a crime. See also;
Kelly v. Lewellyn (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1921) 274 F. 112; Accardo v. Fontenot
(C. C. A. 5, 1922) 278 F. 871; Connally v. Gardner (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1921)
272 F. 911.
3.4 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1878) 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5067.
35 In Wassal v. Leder (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1921) 274 Fed. 489, the trial court
thought that a determination that a tax was in reality a penalty should be
made by a court of final jurisdiction and therefore denied the injunction.
See also Violette v. Walsh (C. C. A. 9, 1922) 282 F. 582; Kohlhammer v.
Smietanka (D. C. N. D. ll. E. D. 1917) 239 F. 408.
1f Drexal Furn. Co. v. Bailey (1922) 259 U. S. 20. Also: Houck v. Little
River District (1915) 239 U. S. 254; New Jersey v. Anderson (1906) 203
U. S. 483.
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ing to a legal tax, but the words "any tax" include both legal and
illegal taxes.17
A result similar to that reached where a penalty is called a tax,
is reached where there is an attempted enforcement of a tax
against the property of third party or of a non-taxpayer, which is
not properly due. A non-taxpayer's property should not be taken
for taxes owed by a taxpayer.' s In Owensboro Ditcher and Grader
Co. v. Lucas 19 the transferee of property sued to restrain the levy
against him for taxes assessed before he acquired the property.
The injunction was granted the court remarking, that the mere
fact the collector claims under a taxing statute does not bring into
play the prohibition of section 3224. The court feared that if
a third party were held liable widespread abuses would be pos-
sible. A collector could levy on the property of any third person
with impunity and that person would be without the needed pre-
ventive remedy. 20
It appears to be the rule that courts of equity will grant an in-junction against a corporation to prevent it from voluntarily pay-
ing an illegal or unconstitutional tax because of the multiplicity
of suits involved and the irreparable damage.2 1 If a corporation
voluntarily pays, a suit would be precluded in most cases by the
rule that a tax must be paid under protest if the taxpayer is to
recover. If the corporation should refuse to sue for a return of
the tax it would take a multiplicity of suits by the stockholders to
recover. Injunction suits, while apparently evasions of section
3224, have been entertained by the Federal courts.22 In Pollock
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 23 it was said, "the jurisdiction of a
court of equity to prevent a threatened breach of trust in the mis-
application or diversion of these funds of a corporation by illegal
payment out of its capital or profits has been frequently sustain-
ed" (citing cases). It was on this principle the court took juris-
diction and no reference was made to section 3224. A suit to
prevent the payment of a tax even though it does not involve an
officer of the United States has been treated as a suit for the pur-
IT Snyder v. Marks (1883) 109 U. S. 189; Dodge v. Osborn (1916) 240
U. S. 118.
L8 ong v. Rasmussen (D. C. Mont. 1922) 281 F. 236.
'9 (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 798.
20 In Hubbard Investment Co. v. Brast (C. C. A. 4, 1923) 59 F. (2d) 709,
property of one person was being distrained for tax of another. The court
expressly refused to apply section 3224 but denied the injunction because of
a lack of equity.
21 Dodge v. Woolsey (1856) 18 How. 331.
22 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429; Brushaber
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1.
28 Cf. note 22.
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pose of restraining the assessment or collection of a tax, hence
this principle must be classified as an exception to the operation
of the statutes. There are some cases in lower courts involving
identical situations in which section 3224 was applied. 24
Trustees and receivers are officers of the courts, the funds they
control are in the hands of the court and it is held not contrary to
section 3224 and not in excess of the court's jurisdiction to grant
a restraining order to prevent voluntary compliance with orders
of Bureau of Internal Revenue, 25 or to instruct such officers as to
paying a tax where it is thought that property or the income from
property in their control is not subject to a tax.20
The broadest exception, and the one which might logically in-
clude those previously indicated, is the granting of an injunction
where there exist special and extraordinary circumstances which
the court believes justify a restraining order. An examination
of the cases reveals the judges have a different and distinct mean-
ing in mind when they refer to "extraordinary circumstance"
than when they base their decision on the previously mentioned
exceptions.
The most important case and the most widely quoted as au-
thority in this connection is Hill v. Wallace.27 A bill was sought
to prevent collection of taxes under the Futures Trading Act. To
pay the tax of twenty cents a bushel on wheat in each future trans-
action and sue to get it back would have involved a multiplicity of
suits. To refuse to pay the tax involved a heavy penalty, and
the stopping of the business of the Chicago Board of Trade. The
court first determined if there were equities involved, and, finding
there were, granted the injunction. It expressly recognized the
principle that section 3224 of the Revised Statutes does not pre-
vent an injunction in a case apparently within its terms in which
some extraordinary and entirely exceptional circumstance makes
its provisions inapplicable. Two earlier cases were referred to
as authority which had also enunciated this rule.28
24 Straws v. Abrant Realty Co. (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1912) 200 F. 327; Stan-
ton v. Baltic Mining Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 103. The Stanton case refers to
the Brushaber case as deciding the issue of constitutionality raised.25 Weeks v. Sibley (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1920) 269 F. 155.
26 Scott v. Western Pacific R. Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1917) 246 F. 545.
27 (1922) 259 U. S. 44.
28 Dodge v. Osborn (1916) 240 U. S. 119, injunction was denied because no
equity was proven but note, "It is obvious that the statute plainly forbids the
enjoining of a tax unless by some extraordinary and entirely exceptional
circumstance its provisions are not applicable." Dodge v. Brady (1916)
240 U. S. 122, the bill was also dismissed on its merits, the court retaining
jurisdiction because of the exceptional circumstance.
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This comes near to the view taken in Miller v. Standard Nut
Margarine Co., 29 but Chief Justice Taft, who wrote the opinion
above, was not ready to admit the full extent of his actual hold-
ing. The established equitable rule is, that jurisdiction will not
be accepted except under exceptional and unusual circumstan-
ces. 30 This is exactly the same as the status of the law previous
to section 3224. In Graham v. Dupont,31 Chief Justice Taft said,
"Hill v. Wallace should, in fact, be classed with Lipke v. Lederer,
supra, as a penalty in the form of a tax". This is usually referred
to as a limitation on the value of Hill v. Wallace as a precedent,
but it is certain Chief Justice Taft did not have this in mind when
Hill v. Wallace was decided, for jurisdiction was accepted before
the tax was declared invalid on consideration of the merits. He
spoke of the imposition in the Wallace case as a tax in accepting
jurisdiction. The Dupont case had little effect in limiting the
rule in cases which followed,3 2 although at the time it was con-
sidered a decision which would stop encroachments on the statute
and prevent it becoming a dead letter.33
The few cases in which injunctions have been granted because
of unusual or extraordinary circumstances have called irrepa-
rable injury or multiplicity of suits such circumstances and thus
have reached a result the same as if the statute had not existed.
The most striking fact revealed by examination of the cases
decided since section 3224 is the reluctance of the courts to re-
fuse an injunction solely under the authority of the statute. In
a majority of cases the courts go to some length and what should
be unnecessary detail, in view of the statute, in searching to see
if there is not a lack of equity. 34 Statements like this are typical.
"It seems clear that the bill states no cause of action of which a
court of equity can take jurisdiction . . . no reason is set
forth in this case why the legal remedy is not adequate, and it fol-
lows that relief in equity must be denied." 35
29 Cf. note 7.
30 Cf. note 2.
31 (1924) 262 U. S. 234.
32 See Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page (D. C. R. I. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 948.
3 Cf. note 6.
3 Dodge v. Osborn (1916) note 28 above; Hubbard Inv. Co. v. Brast, note
20 above; Alexander v. Mid-continent Pet. Co. (C. C. A. 10, 1931) 51 F.
(2d) 735; Thornhill Wagon Co. v. Noel (D. D. E. D. Va. 1926) 17 F. (2d) 407;
Emauss Silk Co. v. McGrughn (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 661;
Roepling v. Sturgess (D. C. N. J. 1923) 292 F. 1012; Union Fisherman's Co-
op. Packing Co. v. Huntley (D. C. Ore. 1923) 285 F. 671.
35 Israelite House of David v. Holden (D. C. W. D. Mich. 1926) 14 F.
(2d) 701.
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In George ,v. Bailey3 16, injunction was sought against the Child
Labor Tax. Complainant's counsel argued that this was a pen-
alty and not a tax and hence the court was not ousted of jurisdic-
tion by section 3224. The injunction was denied but the court
did not recognize the above argument. Its decision was placed
squarely on the proposition that the proof failed to show com-
plainant lacked a remedy at law. It was said the tax should
have been paid and suit brought for its recovery. In the same
term of court the Child Labor Tax was declared unconstitutional
in a suit brought to recover a tax already paid.37
In the cases in which the judge places his entire reliance on
section 3224 the same result would have been reached usually
without the statute.8 An adequate remedy at law is usually
available to the person seeking the injunction; hence there is no
basis for an equity court to take jurisdiction. It is not meant to
deny that the judges have regarded section 3224 as a bar to their
interfering with the tax in these cases, but simply to assert that
they need not have so regarded the statute to have reached the
same result.
In the opposite extreme it has not always been thought neces-
sary to mention section 3224 in denying injunctions. In Keogh
v. Neeley,3 9 the complainant contended that because Illinois had
not been redistricted, a republican form of government no longer
existed, and the national government had failed in its duty of
maintaining it. Therefore, plaintiff contended, he owed no tax
to the Federal government. The injunction was denied without
reference to section 3224, but because the courts have no power
to stay the hand of the Federal government on the ground alone
that the government has become derelict in its duties, and par-
ticularly where the dereliction does not affect the tax at issue.
Complainant's case failed to show an equity. There was no
showing complainant could not have recovered the tax at law if
he was made to pay wrongfully. 40
Section 3224 did operate to bar a suit which would have
normally been entertained in equity in the absence of such a
36 (1921) 259 U. S. 16.
37 Cf. note 16.
s Salikoff v. McCaughin (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 434; Erie Taxi
Co. v. Gnichtel (D. C. N. J. 1926) 17 F. (2d) 661; Sigman v. Reinke (C. C. A.
7, 1924) 297 F. 1005; Black v. Rafferty (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1923) 287 F. 937;
Joseph Garneau Co. Inc. v. Bowers (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 378;
Markle v. Kirkendall (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1920) 267 F. 498.
89 (C. C. A. 7, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 685.
40 See also, Czieslik v. Burnett (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 715;
Nicholas v. Gaston (C. C. A. 1, 1922) 281 F. 67.
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statute in Reineke v. Peacock,41 where a cestui que trust sought
an injunction to prevent payment of taxes from the trust estate.
It was contended that because of jurisdiction of courts of equity
over the trust the injunction could properly be granted. The
court agreed with this as a general proposition, but felt that it
was prohibited from exercising its power by the statute. If the
court had held the view expressed in the Miller case, the injunc-
tion would properly have been granted.
The usual ground for denial of equitable jurisdiction is that an
adequate remedy at law is present because plaintiff can sue and
recover the tax after payment under protest. A suit for return
of the tax furnishes a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at
law. 42 The creation of the Board of Tax Appeals has made pos-
sible a complete review of the tax before payment in income and
inheritance tax cases.4 3
Dupont v. Graham44 is usually referred to as an important case
where plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law and yet failed to
be successful in securing a restraining order. Complainant was
barred by the statute of limitation from prosecuting a regular
appeal. It was shown he had allowed the time to elapse which
barred his administrative appeal by his own dilatory tactics and
the court felt this should preclude a suit in equity. The decision
can be explained by the maxim, "Equity aids the vigilant."
Where the taxpayer's right to an administrative appeal is barred
by the statute of limitations and his case does not fall within the
facts of the Dupont case he should be allowed to bring an equitable
suit.
In Seaman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York,45 the complain-
ant asked an injunction to prevent the trust company from turn-
ing over securities which belonged to complainant to the collector,
who had levied on them for payment of a tax. He claimed the
tax was barred by the five year statute. The injunction was de-
nied, because, even if the collector's action was unauthorized and
was a violation of the rights of the complainant, the latter had a
remedy at law. So also in Ellay v. Bowers, 46 the injunction was
denied under a similar state of facts, although the court stated,
"Thus it is clear that the appellant's remedy at law is complete
and adequate and section 3224 makes it exclusive." It is sub-
mitted that section 3224 would not have been necessary to make
1 (C. C. A. 7, 1924) 3 F. (2d) 583.
42 Emauss Silk Co. v. McGaughn. Note 34 above.
4' 26 U. S. C. 211 et seq.
44Note 31 above.
45 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 391.
48 (C. C. A. 2, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 637.
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the remedy at law exclusive, but the historic rules of equity would
have accomplished the same end. The holding in these two cases
makes it evident that the court does have regard to the established
equitable principles even when applying the prohibitions of the
statute.
Sufficient cases have been discussed to illustrate the hedging
done when applying section 3224 when denying jurisdiction to is-
sue an injunction against a tax. They are fairly typical of the
majority of instances in which injunctions were denied which had
for their purpose the invalidating of a tax. In most of the cases
the same result would have been reached in the absence of the
statute.
Where injunctions were granted the courts did not consciously
disregard section 3224, but the effect of their decisions was to
render it meaningless or at least superfluous. They have not re-
garded the statute as being absolutely prohibitory of equity ju-
risdiction and have issued injunctions which had the effect of re-
straining assessment or collection of taxes where a proper
equitable basis could be shown. The principle has been laid
down that this would be done only where the facts present an
extraordinary case. A suit by a stockholder against a corpora-
tion to restrain payment of an illegal tax and a suit by a third
party to prevent sale of his property for the taxes of another,
are considered proper cases for injunction. Where the imposi-
tion was not a true tax there was no difficulty in allowing the in-
junction. The unusual and extraordinary circumstances doctrine
enunciated in Hill v. Wallace can only be explained as a statement
of the ordinary equity principle, for equity relief is properly
given by injunction only in unusual and extraordinary cases.
Thus, it is apparent Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. is
not as revolutionary as it might appear at first blush. Mr. Justice
Butler stated a principle in it that was followed in previous cases
by indirection. It is submitted that the effect of the judicial
holdings, climaxed by the above case, has been to repeal section
3224 as effectively as its removal from the statute books by Con-
gress. This is the undeniable result if it be assumed Congress in
1867 meant to prohibit all injunctions, as the plain language of
the -statute indicated.
In view of the previous course of judicial interpretation of the
statute it is not correct to say that the Miller decision will revolu-
tionize equity jurisdiction in tax matters. It states no startling
innovation but it does obviously and openly take away the ef-
fectiveness of the statute. This seems to open a loophole for ex-
tending the power of equity courts in granting injunctions in tax
cases. The principles enforced in equity are more flexible than
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss4/4
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the prohibitory provisions of a statute and permit some equivoca-
tion on the part of judges. There should be a considerable in-
crease in attempts to secure restraining orders against the Col-
lector of Internal Revenue, for the net effect of previous decisions
had been to discourage bringing such suits. The impression was
that injunctions would be granted only in most extraordinary cir-
cumstances and within well defined limits. If reference is to
be had only to established equity principles will not taxpayers be-
lieve their chances are better to get their complaint heard than
if section 3224 is given a nearly literal interpretation? The de-
cisions in the lower federal courts should be more harmonious
since the Supreme Court has definitely accepted the view ex-
pressed in the Miller case. Also, it would seem that the law in
relation to the granting of injunction against federal taxes should
be brought in harmony with the law in relation to injunction
against state taxes, if in both cases equitable rules are to be ap-
plied.47
The question proposed in the title to this note can now be
answered; injunction against the assessment or collection of a
federal tax is available, when there is not present and available
to the complainant an adequate remedy at law, there is irreparable
injury, or a multiplicity of suits will be prevented by a restrain-
ing order.48
VICTOR P. KEAY, '33.
41 The enjoining of state taxes has usually been treated as a separate
problem. See Cooley, Taxation, above note 1, section 1662 et seq.; Note, 41
Yale Law Journal 769 (1932). A suit in equity will be entertained by
Federal courts for purpose of restraining a state tax in a proper case.
Johnson v. Wells Fargo Ex. Co. (1915) 239 U. S. 234. A suit in equity will
not lie to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax on the sole ground
that it is illegal but there must be special circumstances bringing it under
some recognized head of equity jurisdiction and the right to such relief must
be clear where the court is asked to restrain collection of a state tax. Pristy
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (1925) 270 U. S. 378. This seems to be the
same principle which the courts have applied under section 3224 and which
should be applied in view of the Miller Case. But this is the difference, the
Federal courts have been much more critical of the adequate remedy at law
provided in state taxing systems than they have under the Federal taxing
system. If a reasonable interest on refund is not provided for in the state
law, provision for refunds on application of the taxpayer does not give him
an adequate remedy at law. Nutt v. Ellerpe (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1932) 56 F.
(2d) 1058.
48 See note (1932) 45 Harv. Law Rev. 1221.
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